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In The Egyptian Book of the Dead, a soul meets its judges and illustrates its innocence by enumerating the acts that it has not performed, including stealing, killing, lying, and, (oddly) wading into water.​[1]​  Presumably, then, a damnable soul is guilty of some range of morally dubious actions.  
In Dante’s Inferno, sinners are cast into deeper and deeper levels of Hell based on the turpitude of their crimes: the worse the crime, the deeper into Hell they are cast.  Thus, Achilles resides in the second circle of Hell because of his lust and Ciacco in the third because of his gluttony while Brunetto Latini’s violent sins against nature led him to be cast into the seventh circle and Ulysses’ fraud led him to be cast into the eighth.  The very worst sinners like Brutus and Judas and Satan are guilty of an especially heinous crime—the betrayal of a benefactor—and it is they who take up residence in the very deepest levels of Hell.  And since the deepest levels of Hell are reserved for the very worst sort of people, arguably, being the morally worst sort of person is a function of being the agent of the morally worst sort of actions.  
The thesis I ascribe to Dante finds support in the penal law as well.  It is often enough suggested that capital punishment should be reserved for the worst crimes; Mill seems to think so given he favorably notes that capital punishment is “the most appropriate” punishment for those guilty of capital murder… the greatest crime known to the law.”​[2]​  The Model Penal Code demands that a defendant be given a capital sentence only if his crime is “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.”​[3]​ In an attempt to standardize capital sentencing procedures, forensic psychologist Michael Welnar has developed the “Depravity Scale” to assist juries in determining how depraved and heinous a particular crime is; in that context, Welner suggests that the Depravity Scale can be used to determine who is evil and that the “effort to define evil focuses on what a person does.”​[4]​ Intriguingly, in the state of Florida, a jury may regard the perceived fact that a defendant’s crime is evil as an aggravating circumstance and, absent any mitigation, sentence him to death.​[5]​ 
In what follows, I shall consider the relationship between evil actions, evildoers—that is, persons disposed to perform evil actions—and evil people.  Roughly, I defend the simple thesis that being an evil person just is being an evildoer.  

II.	Evil Persons and Evildoing
In a thoughtful and provocative book, Claudia Card recommends “atrocities” like genocide, slavery, torture, rape, battery, and child abuse as paradigmatic examples of “evils.”​[6]​ Evils, on Card’s account, are harms that are reasonably foreseeable and culpably inflicted that deprive others of the basics necessary to make life tolerable or decent.​[7]​  With this “root concept” in place, Card suggests that “To call someone evil without qualification is to imply that the person’s character is evil” and that being “potentially evil” is to “have something real… in one’s character, in virtue of which one’s evil doing would be no accident.”​[8]​ I take it, then, that being actually evil and not merely potentially so similarly requires a flawed character in virtue of which evildoing is no accident.  
Still, Card cautions that “evil people need not be evildoers.”​[9]​ Similarly, while Adam Morton offers a theory of evil action, he claims that “it is important to keep the acts and the people separate.”​[10]​ Indeed, rather many philosophers deny that evil people must be evildoers or, at least, that every evildoer is an evil person.​[11]​ Other philosophers are more willing to identify the two.  After identifying actions like mass murder, genocide, and terror bombing as clear cases of evildoing, Feinberg declares that voluntarily performing such actions because they are believed to be cases of evildoing “reflects evil on the character of the doer” and that “insofar as the doer is disposed generally to act in similar ways from similar motives, he is an evil person.”​[12]​  John Kekes initially identifies evil with undeserved harm and suggests that an evil person is a “regular source of evil”​[13]​ and that “evil people do [evil] regularly, excessively, malevolently, and inexcusably.”​[14]​  Laurence Thomas proposes that a person is evil if he is “often enough prone to do evil acts.”​[15]​ Stephen De Wijze assumes that an evil person “is one who has the disposition to welcome evil actions, purposes, or states of affairs.”​[16]​  
Importantly, I read philosophers like Feinberg, Kekes, Thomas, and De Wijze as endorsing the following:
The Disposed to Evil Action Thesis (DEA): an evil person just is the sort of person who is disposed to perform evil actions
(DEA) should initially be viewed with some skepticism.  After all, it is not generally true that the agent of an M action must herself be M; we are commonly told that one can say a racist thing without being racist, for example.  Still, (DEA) is prima facie plausible.  First, it correlates well with an epistemology of evil personhood.  Presumably, we chiefly identify putative evil people in terms of what they do.  Anecdotally, the neighbors of serial killers typically remark that “He seemed like such a nice boy” or some such thing.  Second, (DEA) helps to explain why we might want an account of evil personhood: evil actions at least often result in morally significant harm and suffering such that anyone interested in preventing such harm and suffering should have an interest in evil personhood.
	Another reason to find (DEA) plausible is evident if the following thesis is considered:
The Disposed to Morally Wrong Action Thesis (DWA): a person is evil only if she is the sort of person who is disposed to perform morally wrong actions
Situationalist psychologist Philip Zimbardo appears to endorse (DWA) when he suggests that “Evil consists in intentionally behaving in ways that harm, abuse, demean, dehumanize, or destroy innocent others—or using one’s authority and systematic power to encourage or permit others to do so on your behalf.”​[17]​  But some caution is needed.  (DWA) is plausible only if it is understood as a necessary condition for evil personhood.  After all, rather many of we otherwise morally decent folk are disposed to harm or abuse or demean—at least, a number of children are disposed to abuse and demean each other—but it is not plausibly that so many of us are evil.  Even if morally bad people are disposed to act wrongly, something distinguishes evil people from merely morally bad people; (DEA) goes some way to capturing that difference.  
	Despite what I take to be its advantages, (DEA) is often enough rejected.  In the following section I consider a series of objections to (DEA) and articulate what I take to be the underlying rationale underlying them.

II.	Objections to (DEA)
The objections that follow are ordered purposefully.  I contend not just that they are misguided but that answering them in order amounts to making an increasingly stronger case for identifying evil people and evildoers.

One Sort of Counter-Example: Benn and Haybron
One objection to (DEA) is motivated by counter-examples of the sort offered here by Stanley Benn:
[Not] every wrongdoer [is] evil… And conversely, someone who was fully conscious and rational but also completely paralyzed and aphasic, who spent his life hating everyone about him, rejoicing in their misfortune, wishing them ill, and reveling in malignant fantasies, would be a wicked person who did no wrong at all.​[18]​
Benn’s paralyzed aphasiac is unable to engage in any wrongdoing yet uncontroversially evil because he is so very hateful and malignant.  Noting Benn’s example, Dan Haybron suggests two more: “a thoroughly hateful and mean-spirited coward” who is paralyzed by fear of divine retribution and a mean-spirit who has “grown too old for much action,” neither of whom get around to acting wrongly.​[19]​ Both agents, however, are so very hateful and malignant and mean that they are rightly identified as evil people if anyone is.  The problem for proponents of (DEA) is not simply that the agents described by Benn and Haybron do not perform evil actions but that they seemingly cannot; for various reasons, they are unable to even act wrongly.  And that suggests that (DEA) is false. 

Another Sort of Counter-Example: McGinn
Colin McGinn proposes a model of evil personhood according to which, roughly, evil persons are disposed to take pleasure in the pain of others and pain in their pleasure.​[20]​  So understood, evil persons are evil in virtue of suffering from an extreme variety of schadenfreude. McGinn’s affective account of evil personhood perhaps has its origins in Hume:
A creature, absolutely malicious and spiteful, were there any such in nature, must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue.  All his sentiments must be inverted, and directly opposite to those which prevail in the human species.  Whatever contributes to the good of mankind as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, must produce uneasiness and disapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is the source of disorder and misery in society, must, for the same reason, be regarded with pleasure and complacency.​[21]​
Surely, an “absolutely malicious and spiteful” person is evil if anyone is.  And while many of we morally decent folk are not beyond a bit of schadenfreude ourselves, our sentiments, unlike those of Hume’s “absolutely malicious and spiteful” creature, are not entirely inverted.  So, he is plausibly regarded as evil even if we are not.
Perhaps McGinn’s proposal seems plausible because we tend to suppose that evil people are sadists, that the worst of us are not indifferent to a victim’s agony but relish it.  Crucially, on McGinn’s account, an evil person is evil in virtue of wrongly taking pleasure in the suffering of others whether or not she is the agent of that suffering.   Thus, McGinn’s account suggests a different sort of counter-example to (DEA): the passive sadist.  Imagine a perverse A Clockwork Orange-type scenario in which a sadistic but sedated and restrained voyeur is constantly exposed to graphic images of suffering and torture, all the while relishing what he sees in orgasmic delight; he is paralyzed, but that does little to ameliorate his viciousness.  If he is sufficiently vicious then McGinn’s passive sadist, like Benn’s paralytic and Haybron’s coward, is rightly regarded as evil even if he is unable to act wrongly.  But then being disposed to engage in evildoing again seems extrinsic to evil personhood and (DEA) seems false.  

The Thinness Dilemma
	I take it for granted that describing someone as “evil” amounts to assessing their character.  The problem with theses like (DEA), Haybron suggests, is that they are “not especially illuminating as a theory of character:  a disposition to perform evil acts might reflect a variety of character flaws. [So] it does not tell us why the evil person does what he does.”​[22]​ It is far from clear what is problematic about the possibility that a disposition to perform evil acts might reflect a variety of character flaws; what, after all, is the argument that there is only one way to be evil?  Still, Haybron’s complaint is not without force.  A bare disposition to perform evil actions does seem to be a rather impoverished account of character: it is a substantially “thin” account perhaps too thin to be useful or of interest.
	Things are arguably worse.  An advantage of thin accounts of evil character is that they allow that evil actions can flow from any variety of morally dubious motives and character traits.  Luke Russell worries that if “evil-revivalists”—that is, those who suppose that some non-trivial number of actual people are evil—reject thin accounts of evil personhood, they will be forced to employ a psychologically “thick” accounts that suggest much richer accounts of the moral psychology of evil people.  On “satanic” accounts of evil personhood, for example, evil people act for the morally worst sort of reasons with the worst sort of feelings believing that they act wrongly, just as Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost seemingly does.  Since satanic accounts require some particular set of propositional attitudes for a person to be evil, satanic accounts are thick.  The problem is that adopting thick conceptions of evil typically leads to evil-skepticism—the thesis that trivially few actual people (or none at all) are evil.​[23]​ If evil people must be like Milton’s Satan, it quickly becomes apparent that there just isn’t anyone like that.  So with thick accounts generally, apparently.
Endorsing (DEA) allows the evil theorist to avoid evil-skepticism but at the cost of embracing a psychologically impoverished and explanatorily impotent account of evil personhood. So, proponents of (DEA) face the following “thinness dilemma”: either embrace evil-skepticism or deny that evil people are evildoers.  Grasping the first horn of the thinness dilemma runs counter to a common intuition that at least some non-trivial number of actual people are evil​[24]​ while grasping the latter horn amounts to rejecting (DEA).

The Banality Dilemma
A final objection to (DEA) has its roots in situationalist psychology.  Quite generally, it is common to overstate the role of dispositional factors such as personality and character traits in explanations of behavior and to understate the role of situational factors in such explanations: this is the so-called fundamental attribution error.  A close variant of the fundamental attribution error involves the assumption that poorly evaluated actions are the result of a correspondingly and proportionately poor character: the worse the actions, the worse their agent.  Given this corollary, the morally worst sort of actions must be the result of the morally worst sort of character—that is, the agents of evil action must themselves be evil people.  Given their similarity, this corollary is problematic since the fundamental attribution error is.  But then (DEA) would seem to be guilty by association and similarly should be rejected.
 	It is common to suppose, as both Card and Feinberg do explicitly, that atrocities like genocide are clear and uncontroversial cases of evildoing.  The final problem for (DEA) becomes stark given reflection on real-life concrete examples of evildoing.  Here is one especially crisp representation of the problem:
…most of the perpetrators of the Holocaust and other cases of mass killing are genocide were extraordinary only by what they did, not by who they were. …the majority of perpetrators of extraordinary evil were not distinguished by background, personality, or previous political affiliation or behavior as having been men or women unusually likely or fit to be genocidal executioners.​[25]​
Speaking of his experiences in Auschwitz, Primo Levi insisted that “I didn’t see a single monster in my time at the camp.  …I saw people like you and I who were acting that way because there was Fascism, Nazism in Germany.”​[26]​ Arguably, the behavior of the Nazi guards at Auschwitz is best explained in terms of situational factors and not in terms of their characters.  Similarly, recall Hannah Arendt’s concern that “The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.”​[27]​ Thus, Arendt familiarly refers to the “banality of evil” exemplified by unremarkable perpetrators of genocide like Eichmann.  The difference between we morally decent folk and the perpetrators of genocide, on this line of reasoning, is a difference in our respective situations, not a difference in our respective characters: they are different from us only in virtue of “what they did, not in virtue of who they are.  If we insist that the banal perpetrators of genocide are evil, then parity of reasoning suggests that we morally decent folk are evil too, an implausible result.  But if we deny that the banal perpetrators of genocide are evil, then (DEA) is false: it would be possible to engage in evildoing but not be an evildoer.  So, the proponent of (DEA) must abandon her theory of evil personhood as wrongheaded, either because (DEA) is false or implausible.  
	Proponents of (DEA) have an embarrassment of riches with respect to objections.  Whatever the initial plausibility of identifying evildoers and evil people, the truth of (DEA) is, at best, in doubt.

III.	Evildoing and Dispositions
My defense of (DEA) depends on making it clear that it suggests a much more complicated and subtle account of evil personhood than often appreciated by its critics.  Once it is clearer what the disposition to engage evildoing involves, the initial plausibility of (DEA) should carry the day.  To clarify, I respond to the above objections in order.

On Benn and Haybron’s Counter-Examples
Reflection on Benn’s paralytic and Haybron’s coward suggests the following recipe for constructing counter-examples to (DEA) ad nauseam: first, describe an agent suffering from a sufficiently depraved character that we reasonably infer that she is evil; second, introduce some mechanism that ensures that she cannot act wrongly in the circumstances in which we would expect her to.  The result is an evil person who is not an evildoer.  
However, this recipe does not really produce counter-examples to (DEA).  Indeed, Benn’s paralytic and Haybron’s coward only seem to be counter-examples if the following widely rejected account of dispositions is assumed:
The Simple Conditional Analysis (SCA): An object, A, is disposed to M in circumstances C just in case A would M if it were the case that C
It is now (almost) universally held that (SCA) is false.​[28]​  A fragile crystal vase is plausibly disposed to shatter if thrown to the ground, even though the vase could be wrapped securely in bubble wrap such that it does not shatter in the very circumstances in which the disposition would otherwise manifest.  But intuitively, well-wrapped crystal vases are nonetheless disposed to shatter when thrown to the ground: that is why we safely package them.  Similarly, a lethal poison is presumably disposed to kill if ingested, even though a person could ingest an antidote to counteract the effects of the consumed poison, thereby preventing death.  But intuitively, lethal poisons are nonetheless disposed to kill; that is why we have antidotes on hand.  The dispositions of the vase and the poison have merely been masked, not removed. Generally, a disposition is masked when its manifestation is prevented from occurring even when its conditions of manifestation obtain.​[29]​  Crucially, the intrinsic properties in virtue of which the vase is disposed to shatter and the poison is disposed to kill are not altered such that the packaged vase remains fragile and the neutralized poison remains lethal.  
	Again, evildoers are, roughly, disposed to perform evil actions.  If being disposed to perform evil actions requires actually performing such actions in the relevant conditions, then Benn’s paralytic and Haybron’s coward are not evildoers precisely because they would not perform evil actions in those conditions.  But given we have reason to reject (SCA), this line of reasoning is not convincing.  Note also that the paralytic’s paralysis does nothing to eliminate his extreme maliciousness in virtue of which he seems evil, nor does the coward’s cowardice; it is not as though their inability to act makes them better people, after all.  Since the relevant properties intrinsic to their evil characters persist—for example, their extreme viciousness—it is appropriate to suppose that they are disposed to perform evil actions even though they would not perform evil acts in the relevant manifestation conditions.​[30]​ Their dispositions to perform evil actions are masked, but masked dispositions are dispositions.  Since Benn and Haybron’s agents plausibly remain disposed to perform evil actions, they are no counter-examples to (DEA).  

On McGinn’s Counter-Example
McGinn’s sadist similarly involves a masked disposition to act wrongly, depending on how the example is described.  Even if the sadist is tranquilized or otherwise subdued, he still might actively cause the suffering of others if not but for his restraints; perhaps he is muzzled in the way that vicious dogs are but no less disposed to act wrongly for all that.  But then McGinn’s sadist is no more counter-example to (DEA) than Benn’s paralytic or Haybron’s coward.  To be a genuine counter-example to (DEA), McGinn needs an agent who, first, takes so much perverse pleasure in the gratuitous suffering of others that he is rightly regarded as evil, but, second, would never take any steps to cause the suffering of others and thereby act wrongly even if he could.  He must never, for example, reach an inch to his left to push a button to activate a torture machine or nod his head to indicate that the suffering victim should be tortured further, no matter how much pleasure he takes in his victim’s agony.  Intuitions may vary here, but I confess I find it difficult to conceive of such a person; he would be, at least, instrumentally irrational to the point where I am uncertain that he is even a rational agent such that I have difficulty imagining what he is like.​[31]​  After all, the fact that someone takes perverse pleasure in the suffering of others is also prima facie evidence that he would take at least some steps to cause or prolong that suffering—that he is disposed to act wrongly.
Reflection on McGinn’s sadist suggests a quite general lesson about dispositions: dispositions tend to be “clustered,” such that if A is disposed to M in circumstances C, A is probably also disposed to do something rather similar to M in conditions rather similar to C.  For example, fragile vases are not only disposed to shatter if thrown to the ground but to shatter into several pieces if thrown against the wall, to break if struck with hammers, and so forth.  Similarly, if McGinn’s sadist really is disposed to take pleasure in the suffering of others when they are in pain, that disposition is probably clustered with other dispositions that manifest in similar ways in similar circumstances, including the disposition to prolong the suffering of others when they are in pain, for example.  But then the disposition that marks McGinn’s sadist is bound to be clustered with other dispositions as well, including dispositions that ground a tendency to perform evil actions.  Again, (DEA) survives an ostensible counter-example.
If this hypothesis that the disposition to act wrongly will be clustered with other, similar dispositions, then the proponent of (DEA) can begin to mount a response to the thinness dilemma.  For ascribing a disposition to perform evil actions to a person amounts to implicitly ascribing to her a host of other clustered dispositions as well, including dispositions that suggest a much richer psychological profile of evil persons than initially anticipated.  This becomes especially clear given reflection on the nature of evil action.
	
IV.	Evildoing and Evil Action
Any account of evil action must proceed in light of two plausible assumptions.  First, an account of evil action must make sense of Card’s suggestion that evil actions are “the worst wrongs people do.”​[32]​  Second, it is often enough suggested that there is a qualitative difference between evil actions and (merely) morally wrong actions.​[33]​  So understood, any plausible account of evil action must explain what differentiates evil actions from (merely) morally wrong ones.
One rather obvious property that might differentiate evil acts from others concerns the harm produced by evil actions.  Perhaps evil actions result in great harm whereas merely morally wrong actions do not.  In one sense, a harm, H1, is greater than another, H2, if there is more of H1; in this sense, torturing someone for two hours is a greater harm than torturing them for one, killing three people is a greater harm than killing two, and so forth.  But this difference in harm is a quantitative difference, not a qualitative one, and so it cannot plausibly illustrate the difference between evil and (merely) morally wrong actions.  More plausibly, evil actions result in great harm in the sense that they result in an altogether different kind of harm.  Recall that Card identifies evils, not with harms simpliciter, but with harms culpably inflicted that deprive their victims of the basics of a tolerable and decent life.  Similarly, Stephen de Wijze distinguishes “Great Harms” like gratuitous humiliation and denigration, of home or habitat, and the misery of continual and unrelenting terror from comparatively slight harms associated with, say, embarrassment and hunger.​[34]​  
There is a worry that we have not come very far: the present hypothesis is that evil actions are qualitatively different from (merely) wrong actions because the effects of evil actions are, well, qualitatively different from the effects of (merely) morally wrong actions.  There is also bound to be a conflict of intuitions here: why is it, exactly, that only acts resulting in grave harms are evil?  Couldn’t an evil person earn that title in virtue of consistently and maliciously inflicting comparatively minor harms, relishing in her comparatively minor wrongdoing absent any compunction?  Consider the wicked Claggart, antagonist of Melville’s Billy Budd: Sailor.  Claggart’s actions never result in the grave harms associated with, say, genocide, but he is plausibly evil for all that.
If the qualitative difference that distinguishes evil actions from (merely) morally wrong actions does not bottom out in a difference in their effects, it would seem that it must involve a difference in the psychological states that produce them.​[35]​  Broadly, the sort of psychological states that are relevant to evaluation actions can be divided into three different camps: motives, beliefs, and affective states.  The presence (or absence) of any of these psychological states would seem to amount to a qualitative difference: evil actions would be caused or accompanied by these psychological states while (merely) morally wrong actions would not be caused or accompanied by them, or vice versa.
Consider first the possibility that evil actions have (or lack) some unique motive.  Perhaps some motives are morally worse than others such that evil actions are prompted by those especially morally grave motives. It is perhaps tempting to suppose that evil actions must derive from some especially morally dubious motive, such as the desire to pursue evil “as an end in itself,” arguably the “most evil desire of all.”​[36]​ However, if acts of genocide really are paradigmatically evil actions, as Card and Feinberg suggest, then it must be admitted that at least very many evil actions resulted from fairly ordinary and innocent motives.  It oddly aggrandizes the Nazi’s motives by suggesting, for example, that they pursued “evil for its own sake.”​[37]​ Arguably, at least, Stangl merely acted “out of survival”​[38]​ and Eichmann “had no motives at all” aside from “an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his own personal advancement.”​[39]​  There is a fatal dilemma for any account that explains the qualitative difference between evil and merely morally wrong actions solely in terms of motive: evil actions either have their origins in rare but especially morally dubious motives or in familiar but banal motives; if the former too few actions are evil, but if the latter too few actions are.  
Consider, then, the possibility that evil actions are evil in virtue of resulting from certain beliefs.  There is real disagreement about the beliefs of putative evil people—about whether, for example, Adolf Hitler and Osama Bin Laden genuinely believed that their actions are in pursuit of a genuinely morally worthy goal.​[40]​ Some argue that believing that one acts rightly exonerates one from the charge of evildoing: perhaps the agent of the even the most harmful acts possesses “the saving grace of conscientiousness” if she falsely and non-culpably believes that she acts rightly, a saving grace that evil people presumably lack.​[41]​  By contrast, some deny that evildoing requires an agent who believes that she acts wrongly; perhaps even if Eichmann, for example, was thoughtlessly motivated by banal motives, he remains the agent of evil acts.​[42]​ 
It is at unclear, then, whether evildoing requires a belief that one’s action is wrong at all.  However, for present purposes, this question need not be answered.  For even if someone believes correctly that she acts wrongly and her act causes grave harm and suffering, it does not follow that she is guilty of evildoing.  For it is possible to believe that one’s gravely harmful action is wrong while feeling compunction for so acting; a child molester might be cognizant about the moral gravity of what he does, but also feel shame and guilt and remorse.  Generally, an evil person just is the morally worst sort of person such that if someone could be of a morally worse sort then she is not evil, whatever else is wrong with her.​[43]​ Arguably, then, evil actions just are the morally worst sort of actions such that if an action could be of a morally worse sort then it is not evil, whatever else might be said about it.  So, just as agents who feel compunction for their wrongdoing are not as morally bad people as otherwise similar agents who fail to feel any such compunction, actions performed with occurrent compunction are not as morally bad actions as otherwise similar acts performed absent compunction.  Since an action is not evil if performed with compunction, it follows that evil actions must, at least, be performed absent compunction.  
	The thesis that evil actions are of a morally worst sort than actions performed absent compunction is prone to the following objection: whether or not an action is performed with compunction is not essential to its ontology as an action such that it is mistaken to suppose that actions performed without compunction are “of a different sort” than actions performed with a compunction.  If this objection is correct, then the alleged difference between evil and non-evil acts disappears.  But the objection is surely misguided.  While there is significant controversy about whether or not an agent’s reasons—understood broadly—causally explain her actions, it is widely supposed that an agent’s reasons teleologically explain her action.​[44]​ If an action just is an event that is teleologically and non-deviantly explained by an agent’s reasons, then the ontology of a particular action surely depends upon the reasons that explain that action.  And it is a mistake to suppose that an agent’s emotions and affective states of an agent have no role to play in the production and explanation of her intentional actions.​[45]​ Thus, it is a mistake to suppose that her emotions and affective states are not among her reasons for acting.  As such, the fact that an action is (or is not) accompanied by emotions like regret and shame and remorse does plausibly imply that it is (or is not) of some particular sort.​[46]​ Generally, then, it is plausible to suppose both that actions performed with compunction are of a different sort than actions performed without compunction.  And since this difference is a morally relevant one, actions performed without compunction are plausibly regarded as being worse than actions performed with compunction such that the latter sort of action is wrongly regarded as evil.
To be clear: while I do not pretend to have offered a full-blown analysis, I maintain that evil acts must be performed absent any feelings of regret or remorse or shame, whatever else is true of them—that being performed without compunction is a necessary condition for an action to be evil.  Note that this goes some way to explaining how evil actions are qualitatively different from (merely) morally wrong actions: an act might be wrong even if its agent regrets it—a repentant child molester still acts wrongly, after all—but an act cannot be evil if its agent regrets it.
Return, then, to the thinness dilemma that implies that proponents of (DEA) must either adopt an account of evil personhood too psychologically thin to explain much about evil people and what they do or else embrace evil-skepticism.  Perhaps part of what motivates the thinness dilemma is the correct observation that virtues and vices are not plausibly understood as bare dispositions to act: charity, for example, is not simply a disposition to give when the chance arises—opportunistic misers have that disposition.  Thus, an account of evil personhood that only implies that evil people suffer from a bare disposition to act says nothing about the character of that person.  More plausibly, virtues and vices are complicated multi-track dispositional states to perform certain characteristic actions in characteristic circumstances with characteristic feelings and beliefs for characteristic reasons, and so forth.​[47]​  However, it should now be clear that the sort of disposition implicit in (DEA) is not merely a bare disposition to act wrongly, but a complicated multi-track dispositional state that involves, among other things, a failure to feel morally redeeming regret or shame or remorse at one’s perceived wrongdoing.  Further, a person disposed to act wrongly absent compunction is plausibly regarded as suffering from significant moral vices like moral callousness and cruelty; she is surely unjust as well.  So, the disposition to perform evil actions required by (DEA) does suggest a reasonably rich profile of an evil person and her morally depraved character: evil people will be disposed to act wrongly, to lack certain morally redeeming feelings and emotions, to suffer from grave moral vices, and so forth.  But note also that (DEA) is not objectionably thick in the way that, for example, satanic accounts are.  The proponent of (DEA) need not suppose, for example, that evil people will all invariably possess the same motives or desires, much less the desire to act wrongly for the sake of acting wrongly.  
If all this is right, proponents of (DEA) can go between the horns of the thinness dilemma, neither endorsing a psychologically thin account of evil personhood nor evil-skepticism.  Importantly, most philosophers who endorse (DEA) never asserted that a bare disposition to act wrongly suffices for evil personhood.  While Kekes claims that evil people are regular sources of evil, he also notes that evil actions are “predictable expressions of settled dispositions,” including vices like selfishness, cruelty, envy, malice, jealousy, and so forth.​[48]​ While Thomas proposes that a person is evil if he is often enough prone to do evil acts, he also supposes that an evil act is one that “evinces a profound deadening of moral sensibilities,” surely evidence of a flawed character.​[49]​ Note also that even some philosophers who distance themselves from (DEA) can reasonably endorse it once it is clear that (DEA) involves more than a bare disposition to act. While Morton recommends separating evil acts and people, he also commends thinking of evil actions as resulting from “a systematic way of traversing the barriers against atrocity” and thinking of an evil person “as one whose personality has as a central element some way of negotiating the barriers.”​[50]​  But then, on Morton’s own account, there is a necessary connection between evil people and a tendency to perform evil actions, given that guilt and shame and remorse are surely psychological barriers against committing atrocities.  
	Thus far, I have argued that (DEA) is not falsified by counter-examples such as those proposed by Benn and Haybron and McGinn and can survive the thinness dilemma.  However, perhaps the most problematic challenge to (DEA) remains unanswered.

V.	The Banality Dilemma
The banality dilemma, noted above, entails that (DEA) is either implausible or false—that if very many evildoers are evil then so are very many of we morally decent folk are too, but if those evildoers are not evil then (DEA) is false.  Surely anyone interested in theorizing about evil needs to say something intelligible about otherwise decent German citizens who actively participated in the Holocaust, otherwise decent Americans who participated in and enabled racist institutions, otherwise decent Rwandan Hutus who participated in the slaughter of their Tutsi countrymen, and so forth.  Still, the proponent of (DEA) has a special burden given she suggests that evildoing is not simply suggestive of or correlated with evil personhood but constitutive of it.
One response to the banality dilemma is to grasp its first horn: allow that many of more of we morally decent folk—perhaps very many—are evil.  At least some scholars suppose, controversially, that evil people are rather more common than we may have supposed.​[51]​  All of us have counterparts in nearby possible worlds who find themselves in situations similar to those that otherwise decent Germans and Rwandans found themselves, and surely very many of those counterparts similarly participate in and actively enable genocide.  So perhaps the difference between we morally decent folk and seeming evildoers is not that great after all—that we, like them, are evil.
It might be thought that we morally decent folk cannot be evil because we possess some modest moral virtue—what else could it mean to be a morally decent person?—and that possessing modest moral virtue is incompatible with being evil.  But this response is unsatisfactory.  Arguably, the extreme moral vices that ground evil personhood can be so extreme that any modest moral virtue possessed by that person is effectively irrelevant when evaluating her overall moral character: extreme vices might “poison the well” as it were.​[52]​ And in any case, it is simply implausible to suppose that the perpetrators of genocide were completely and invariably unjust and cruel, even in their dealings with family and friends, for example. 
Nonetheless, I am not especially tempted by the thought that very many of us are evil; the concept of the evil person is supposed to mark an extreme sort of character and that which is extreme is usually not that common.  Thus, I am not inclined to grasp the first horn of the banality dilemma.  The defender of (DEA) is then committed to denying (DEA) so long as she continues to agree that the perpetrators of genocide, for example, really did engage in evildoing.  While it is surely difficult to disagree with Card and Feinberg that acts of genocide are paradigmatic examples of evil actions, the proponent of (DEA) can plausibly maintain that, at least very many, perpetrators of genocide are either evil persons or guilty of evildoing.  
At least many of the perpetrators of genocide and atrocities generally do seem to regret and feel remorse and shame for their actions, or, at least, feel regret or remorse or shame soon after performing those actions.  During follow-up interviews, many of the “guards” in the Stanford Prison Experiments indicated their shock and genuine confusion about their actions and expressed compunction for their behavior.​[53]​ Relatedly, scholars have noted the high level of alcohol abuse among Nazi doctors​[54]​ and among Germans serving in Police Battalion 101 following their participation in massacres.​[55]​ Attempting to drown one’s sorrows (or demons) is a familiar enough response to perceived wrongdoing and not the sort of response we expect from unapologetic evildoers.  Generally, the testimony of perpetrators of genocide reveals that they typically suffer from nightmares, anxiety attacks, debilitating guilt and depression, gastrointestinal problems, impotence, hallucinations, substance abuse, and any other of a range of stress reactions soon after their wrongdoing.​[56]​ This sort of traumatic response to being the agent of great harms is apparently common enough that it has been dubbed “perpetration-induced traumatic stress” and is exactly what we would expect from morally decent person following the perpetration of great harm if not from the morally worst sort of persons.​[57]​ More to the point, it is exactly what we would not expect from genuinely evil people.  
Recall the above suggestion that actions performed without compunction are of a morally worst sort than otherwise similar actions performed with it.  If evil actions must be performed absent agent regret or remorse or shame, then the admittedly horrible crimes of at least very many perpetrators of genocide are just wrongly regarded as cases of evildoing. But then the proponent of (DEA) can escape the banality dilemma by grasping its second horn: if the perpetrators of genocide, for example, are evil people then so are we morally decent people.  She simply denies that at least very many perpetrators of genocide are guilty of evildoing.
Another response is somewhat speculative.  In the case of the Stanford “prison guards,” it appears that their behavior is largely a response to changes in their situation: when they believed that they were in positions of authority within the Stanford “prison,” they acted in cruel and abusive and demeaning ways, although they did not act in such ways prior to or following their participation.  Situationalist psychologists have for some time been drawing attention to the fact that small and seemingly irrelevant changes in our situations—for example, finding a dime in a coin slot rather than not, being told that one is late for an appointment, standing near a fragrant bakery—can lead to significant changes in behavior.  Thus, Philip Zimbardo boldly declares that “The line between Good and Evil, once thought to be impermeable, prove[s] instead to be quite permeable,”​[58]​ To the degree that what explains at least much of the behavior of perpetrators of genocide is situational factors then their behavior is not (significantly) explained by dispositional factors, especially their character traits and psychological dispositions. If situationalist explanations of acts of genocide are appropriate, then it seems plausible to conclude that those actions are simply not representative of the sort of depraved character constitutive of evil personhood; rather, those situational factors mask the otherwise morally decent character of the perpetrators.  In that case, at least very many perpetrators of genocide are disposed to feel regret and remorse and shame at their wrongdoing, and thus, are not the sort of person who is disposed to engage in evildoing—that is, morally wrong actions performed absent any moral compunction.  Again, the proponent of (DEA) can reasonably grasp the second horn of the banality dilemma.​[59]​ 

VI.	Conclusion: Situationism and the Very Possibility of Evil Personhood
At this point, however, situationalists may complain that their point has been missed.  Here is one way to capture the problem:
…just as modern moral philosophers were rediscovering the virtues, social psychologists were uncovering evidence that most actual people (including people ordinarily thought to be, say, honest) don’t exhibit virtues of this sort.  The reason wasn’t the one that most moralists would have suspected: that vice far exceeds virtue.  The reason was that most people simply didn’t display such multi-track, context-independent dispositions at all, let alone in a unified ensemble.​[60]​
Arguably, the appropriate conception of the virtues—and, by extension, the vices—is a “globalist” one according to which possession of a virtue involves consistent dispositions to respond in accord with some value across various contexts.​[61]​ The problem noted by situationalists is that since many, if not most, of us do not seem to possess these global dispositions given that our behavior does vary significantly across contexts.  But then many, if not most, of us simply lack the sort of extreme vices constitutive of being an evil person.  
To be sure, there is debate at present about the relevance of situationism to ethics​[62]​ but for present purposes I limit my response to three remarks.  First, the most plausible strong versions of the situationalist challenge only yield the conclusion that stable global dispositions that would count as virtues (or vices) are uncommon and infrequent, not that they are entirely foreign to creatures like us.  Few philosophers sympathetic with virtue ethics would be surprised with that result, and it certainly would not speak against the truth of (DEA).  Relatedly, even supposing that global dispositions constitutive of the virtues are fairly rare, it would not follow, for example that no one is virtuous; one notable scholar sympathetic with the situationalist challenge to virtue ethics allows that “There could, consistent with the evidence, be a sprinkling of saints among us.”​[63]​ Parity of reasoning suggests that there could, consistent with the evidence, be a sprinkling of evil people among us.​[64]​  Admittedly, as noted above, endorsing an account of evil personhood that effectively renders evil people a bare conceptual possibility is bound to lead to evil-skepticism.  Still, allowing that evil people are not that common is hardly the same thing as insisting that they are effectively absent.  
Finally, note that situationalist psychologists who attempt to explain genocidal behavior do not entirely discount the relevance of what would ordinarily be regarded as vices in their explanations.  For example, one plausible explanatory model of genocidal behavior appeals to situational factors but also considers, for example, ethnocentrism and xenophobia and the desire for social dominance.​[65]​ Persons tending to suffer from these moral failings would certainly be regarded as being unjust, cruel, and surly—that is, as suffering from fairly significant moral vices.  Similarly, very many perpetrators of genocide will be morally disengaged with their victims, perhaps by rationalizing their behavior or describing their wrong actions euphemistically—e.g., as “cutting down the tall trees” or “ethnic cleansing.”​[66]​ But such moral disengagement is surely constitutive of moral indifference and if it is done willingly suggests callousness and in any case suggests that the perpetrator suffers from vice in the ordinary sense.  Finally, perhaps to make it clear that they are not excusing the perpetrators of genocide, at least some situationalists are prone to note that perpetrators of genocide are morally responsible for what they do if they willfully fail to exercise their moral judgment.​[67]​ But such willful refusal to exercise moral judgment is suggestive of callousness and cruelty (again), avarice, timidity—it would amount to failure to acknowledge the moral gravity of one’s actions, after all—among other vices.
I conclude then, that taking situationalist psychology seriously still permits us to suppose that there may be individuals suffering from the sort of extreme vices constitutive of evil personhood that ground a disposition to engage in evildoing—i.e., to suppose that evildoers and evil people are possible.  Still, reflection situational psychology suggests something important for philosophers interested in evil people and actions.  Surely part of the reason that we care about understanding evil people and actions is to minimize their occurrence and incidences of harm and suffering along with them.  Insofar as situational factors cause or enable evildoing, it would be remarkably mistaken to focus only on the development of virtuous character, especially given the above admission that genuine virtue may be hard to come by.  If so, then consider the following:
[Virtue ethicists] would do better to try to increase our capacities and resources; to try to promulgate the circumstances in which our excellences can be elicited—the conditions in which we can flourish. …we may do better to “put less emphasis on moral education and on building character and more emphasis on trying to arrange social institutions so that human beings are not placed in situations in which they will act badly.”​[68]​
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